Op-Ed
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Sifat Uddin
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Military dynamics in Egypt crisis
23 Aug, 2013
Since Morsi became the first democratically elected president of Egypt the Egyptians very plainly expected that it would bring a positive change to their lives. They were supposed to have freedom of expression and other democratic rights. But on 22 November 2012 Morsi put a presidential decree. That decree gave him a supreme power above any person. He was forced to rescind the decree a few weeks later. Although the move unquestionably smelt of authoritarianism and had been universally criticised, it can be argued that to some degree Morsi’s seemingly undemocratic move was triggered by a series of actions of courts that undermined his legitimate powers. There had also been some salient features of Morsi’s misrule. Those include -- the use of violence and even torture against protestors by Muslim Brotherhood (MB) supporters during riots in front of Morsi’s palace on December 2012; massive media censorship; investigation for high treason, claimed by the government, against several leaders of the opposition. MB owned media also spread accusations that opposition leaders like Amr Moussa spied for Israel and were part of a US-orchestrated plot to overthrow the government. Morsi’s blatant intention to consolidate power in an authoritarian manner took him into the ditch of hell.
The politics of Egypt is based on republicanism, with a semi-presidential system of government. Like many other modern states there are three branches of state in Egypt — legislative, executive and judiciary. But military wing, Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), is the most powerful above all of them. Military officers in fact, have been ruling the country since 1952 by toppling monarchic system. Following the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 it was widely expected that there would be a breakthrough. The revolution was initially successful since it forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign but could not free Egypt from the clutches of the SCAF. This time SCAF grabbed executive power with popular support. It dissolved parliament and suspended the constitution. This situation sustained until Morsi assumed to power in 2012 through an election. But Morsi, the first ever democratically elected president of Egypt could not stay more than a year. This time Fattah Al Sisi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, produced a successful coup to overthrow Morsi amidst a longstanding political crisis including fierce street battle with pro-Morsi supporters on one side and anti-Morsi on the other.
Hillel Frisch assumes that the unique role of the military in Egypt is even more disconcerting. In Egypt, the armed forces have assumed, contrary to the existing constitution, a guardian role, similar to the Turkish model before the ascendance of the government Justice and Development Party in which the army does not only protect the state against outside competitors but maintains the regime internally as well.
In history it is found that since Colonel Gamal Abd-al Nasser’s absolute rise to power in the mid 1950s, the Egyptian armed forces have neither ruled nor played the role of the guardian of the Egyptian regime. Under Mubarak the army was privileged yet subordinated. This situation had been continued until newly elected President Muhammad Morsi subordinated the Army to his rule in August 2012.
The military is very influential in Egypt’s domestic affairs, politically and economically. Approximately 30% of the Egyptian economy is dominated by the military. It is also well-integrated into the political system in Egypt. However, it has given signs to indicate its support of the demands of the Egyptian people. In its statement deposing Morsi, the military denied engaging in a coup d’état, indicating that it does not intend to run the government. Rather, the military’s actions seem to reinforce what it sees as its traditional role as the “Guardian of the Republic”.
There are also indications that the MB sought to slowly replace the old military leadership with elements that, for personal or ideological reasons, were more sympathetic to the movement. That reshuffle also created discontent in armed forces.
Since it is clear that the Egyptian military quarter had been enjoying a privileged life and well control over the country until Morsi entered the scene, they were looking for a continuation of their past supremacy even during the Morsi period. Eventually this section was looking for changing the status quo. Finally internal factors i.e. political unrest and some external factors assisted them to fulfil its desire.
The writer is a contributor to daily sun.
Source: daily sun