Call it prudent or paranoid, the US has its own concerns of others’ problems which are highly discriminatory. At times, those concerns can turn volatile as is evident in US’ outbursts against Iran’s nuclear programme, although it looked the other way when Israel built up its undeclared nuclear arsenal long ago.

Yet the US’ opposition to Iran’s programme borders on obsession. So much so its ex-president Bush at the fag end of his second term undertook a journey to the Middle East apparently to drum up support from the gulf states in the neighbourhood of Iran for a concerted action against her. His mission remained unfulfilled as his comprador allies in the region did not oblige him this time with their traditional obeisance.

Washington’s focus then shifted to Pakistan where the US’ great anti-terror warrior was in a comatose and fighting losing a battle with the remnants of al-Qaedas.

In the emerging milieu after Benazir Bhutto’s mysterious assassination claimed to be the handiwork of al-Qaeda by Pakistan establishment, the Americans are far from being assured about the safety of the country’s 50-odd nuclear warheads.

Washington is genuinely frightened at this new wave of suicide bombing within Pakistan and countrywide spread of terrorism suspected to be the result of a fresh alacrity of resurgent al-Qaeda and diehard Talibans. The Pakistan government which could assuage the US anxiety seems to be under heavy Anti-Americanism of the Pakistanis embittered with continuing drone attacks killing innocent civilians.

To the American, if a leader of Banazir’s stature could be killed for her liberal views why couldn’t some unidentified rogues from among the Pakistan’s umpteen extremist elements target Kahuta’s Nuclear Shangri-La to rob the country of its strategic asset and take them in their own possessions — the US’ worst fear. The report as to the likelihood of the US, military plan of taking out or securing Pakistan’s nuclear weapon abound. It also gained some legitimacy from time to time. Of course, that is an option only in case of emergency alone. After all, what if something happens to the head of the Army, believed to be the custodian of the nuclear weapons and their secrets. Then the US cannot but feel insecure in letting Pakistan retain the control of those weapons.

Yet any logical mind would raise the question about the possibility of US military finding and getting hold of those weapons. Maybe it will be difficult to locate all weapons, even if the US has some general idea of Pakistan’s security establishment.

Since 9/11 Pakistan has played host to many foreign visitors in the name of war on terror, including various covert and overt foreign agencies who could have been unware of the general location of the weapons and their deployment pattern.

Pakistan’s Strategic Plan Division has long and deep interaction with the Pentagon and American think tanks. So the possibility of information slipping through those channels cannot be ruled out, helping the US in getting hold of the weapons. So far Islamabad has adversely reacted to the leaked out plan of US taking control of nuclear weapons and vociferously condemned the idea. The US also does not seem to realise the political cost of the enterprise. Earlier when the American plan to carry out attacks against suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in tribal areas was made known, both public and official relation were hostile generating fresh Anti- Americanism in Pakistan. Also, the terrorists’ activities escalated.

According to government view in Pakistan any direct action by foreign forces will be highly unpopular and counter-productive. It wouldn’t be surprising if the ranks of al-Qaeda and Talibans got further boost from such action. There is also the fear of Zardari’s inherently unstable regime becoming further destabilised meaning that US would lose the last bastion of liberalism in Pakistan. Yet, by all indications, they will be foolhardy if they risk the rash action by opening up another front of conflict.

Brig (retd) M Abdul Hafiz is a former DG of BIISS.